Robustness Verification of Support Vector Machines by Ranzato, Francesco & Zanella, Marco
Robustness Verification of Support Vector Machines
Francesco Ranzato and Marco Zanella
Dipartimento di Matematica, University of Padova, Italy
Abstract. We study the problem of formally verifying the robustness to adversarial examples of support
vector machines (SVMs), a major machine learning model for classification and regression tasks. Following
a recent stream of works on formal robustness verification of (deep) neural networks, our approach relies on
a sound abstract version of a given SVM classifier to be used for checking its robustness. This methodology
is parametric on a given numerical abstraction of real values and, analogously to the case of neural networks,
needs neither abstract least upper bounds nor widening operators on this abstraction. The standard interval
domain provides a simple instantiation of our abstraction technique, which is enhanced with the domain of
reduced affine forms, which is an efficient abstraction of the zonotope abstract domain. This robustness ver-
ification technique has been fully implemented and experimentally evaluated on SVMs based on linear and
nonlinear (polynomial and radial basis function) kernels, which have been trained on the popular MNIST
dataset of images and on the recent and more challenging Fashion-MNIST dataset. The experimental results
of our prototype SVM robustness verifier appear to be encouraging: this automated verification is fast, scal-
able and shows significantly high percentages of provable robustness on the test set of MNIST, in particular
compared to the analogous provable robustness of neural networks.
1 Introduction
Adversarial machine learning [11,20,38] is an emerging hot topic studying vulnerabilities of machine learning
(ML) techniques in adversarial scenarios and whose main objective is to design methodologies for making
learning tools robust to adversarial attacks. Adversarial examples have been found in diverse application fields
of ML such as image classification, speech recognition and malware detection [11]. Current defense techniques
include adversarial model training, input validation, testing and automatic verification of learning algorithms
(see the recent survey [11]). In particular, formal verification of ML classifiers started to be an active field
of investigation [1,8,10,13,16,19,25,28,29,31,32,39,40] within the verification and static analysis community.
Robustness to adversarial inputs is an important safety property of ML classifiers whose formal verification
has been investigated for (deep) neural networks [1,10,28,31,32,40]. A classifier is robust to some (typically
small) perturbation of its input objects representing an adversarial attack when it assigns the same class to
all the objects within that perturbation. Thus, slight malicious alterations of input objects should not deceive
a robust classifier. Pulina and Tacchella [28] first put forward the idea of a formal robustness verification of
neural network classifiers by leveraging interval-based abstract interpretation for designing a sound abstract
classifier. This abstraction-based verification approach has been pushed forward by Vechev et al. [10,31,32],
who designed a scalable robustness verification technique which relies on abstract interpretation of deep neural
networks based on a specifically tailored abstract domain [32].
While all the aforementioned verification techniques consider (deep) neural networks as ML model, in this
work we focus on support vector machines (SVMs), which is a major learning model extensively and success-
fully used for both classification and regression tasks [7]. SVMs are widely applied in different fields where
adversarial attacks must be taken into account, notably image classification, malware detection, intrusion detec-
tion and spam filtering [2]. Adversarial attacks and robustness issues of SVMs have been defined and studied
by some authors [2,3,26,37,41,43,46], in particular investigating robust training and experimental robustness
evaluation of SVMs. To the best of our knowledge, no formal and automatic robustness certification technique
for SVMs has been studied.
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Contributions. A simple and standard model of adversarial region for a ML classifier C : X → L, where
X ⊆ Rn is the input space and L is the set of classes, is based on a set of perturbations P (x) ⊆ X of an
input x ∈ X for C, which typically exploits some metric on Rn to quantify a similarity to x. A classifier
C is robust on an input x for a perturbation P when for all x′ ∈ P (x), C(x′) = C(x) holds, meaning
that the adversary cannot attack the classification of x made by C by selecting input objects from P (x) [4].
We consider the most effective SVM classifiers based on common linear and nonlinear kernels, in particular
polynomial and Gaussian radial basis function (RBFs) [7]. Our technique for formally verifying the robustness
of C is quite standard: by leveraging a numerical abstraction A of sets of real vectors in ℘(Rn), we define a
sound abstract classifier C] : A→ L ∪ {>} and a sound abstract perturbation P ] : X → A, in such a way that
if C](P ](x)) = C(x) holds then C is proved to be robust on x for the adversarial region P . As usual in static
analysis, scalability and precision are the main issues in SVM verification. A robustness verifier has to scale with
the number of support vectors of the SVM classifier C, which in turn depends on the size of the training dataset
for C, which may be huge (easily tens/hundreds of thousands of samples). Moreover, the precision of a verifier
may crucially depend on the relational information between the components, called features in ML, of input
vectors in Rn, whose number may be quite large (easily hundreds/thousands of features). For our robustness
verifier, we used an abstraction which is a product of the standard nonrelational interval domain [6] and of
the so-called reduced affine form (RAF) abstraction, a relational domain representing the dependencies from
the components of input vectors. A RAF for vectors in Rn is given by a0 +
∑n
i=1 aii + arr, where i’s are
symbolic variables ranging in [-1,1] and representing a dependence from the i-th component of the vector, while
r is a further symbolic variable in [-1,1] which accumulates all the approximations introduced by nonlinear
operations such as multiplication and exponential. RAFs can be viewed as a restriction to a given length (here
the dimension n of Rn) of the zonotope domain used in static program analysis [14], which features an optimal
abstract multiplication [33], the crucial operation of abstract nonlinear SVMs. We implemented our robustness
verification method for SVMs in a tool called SAVer (Svm Abstract Verifier), written in C. Our experimental
evaluation of SAVer employed the popular MNIST [21] image dataset and the recent and more challenging
alternative Fashion-MNIST dataset [42]. Both datasets contain grayscale images of 28×28 pixels, represented
by normalized vectors of floating-point numbers in [0, 1]784. Our benchmarks show the percentage of samples
of the full test sets for which a SVM is proved to be robust (and, dually, vulnerable) for a given perturbation, the
average verification times per sample, and the scalability of the robustness verifier w.r.t. the number of support
vectors. We also compared SAVer to DeepPoly [32], a robustness verification tool for deep neural networks
based on abstract interpretation. Our experimental results indicate that SAVer is fast and scalable and that the
percentage of robustness provable by SAVer for SVMs is significantly higher than the robustness provable by
DeepPoly for deep neural networks.
Illustrative Example. Figure 1 shows a toy binary SVM classifier for input vectors in R2, with four support
vectors sv1 = (8, 7), sv2 = (10,−4), sv3 = (8, 1), sv4 = (9,−5) for a polynomial kernel of degree 2. The
corresponding classifier C : R2 → {–1,+1} is:
C(x) = sign(
∑4
i=1 αiyi(svi · x)2 + b)
= sign(α1(8x1+7x2)
2−α2(10x1−4x2)2−α3(8x1+x2)2+α4(9x1−5x2)2 + b)
where yi and αi are, respectively, the classes (±1) and weights of the support vectors svi, with: α1 ≈ 5.36 ×
10−4, α2 ≈ −3.78× 10−3, α3 ≈ −9.23× 10−4, α4 ≈ 4.17× 10−3, b ≈ 3.33. The set of vectors x ∈ R2 such
that C(x) = 0 defines the decision curve (in red) between labels –1 and +1. We consider a point p = (5, 1) and
an adversarial region P1(p) = {x ∈ R2 | max(|x1 − p1|, |x2 − p2|) ≤ 1}, which is the L∞ ball of radius 1
centered in p and can be exactly represented by the interval in R2 (i.e., box) P1(p) = (x1 ∈ [4, 6], x2 ∈ [0, 2]).
As shown by the figure, this classifier C is robust on p for this perturbation because for all x ∈ P1(p), C(x) =
C(p) = +1.
2
Fig. 1: Example of SVM robustness.
It turns out that the interval abstraction C]Int of this classifier cannot prove the robustness of C:
C]Int(P1(p)) = sign(
∑4
i=1 αiyi((svi)1[4, 6] + (svi)2[0, 2])
2 + b)
= sign(α1y1[1024, 3844] + α2y2[1024, 3600] + α3y3[1024, 2500] + α4y4[676, 2916] + b)
= sign([−9.231596, 12.735958]) = >
Instead, the reduced affine form abstractionC]RAF2 allows us to prove the robustness ofC. Here, the perturbation
P1(p) is exactly represented by the RAF (x˜1 = 5+ 1, x˜2 = 1+ 2), where 1, 2, r ∈ [−1, 1], and the abstract
computation is as follows:
C]RAF2(P1(p)) = sign(
∑4
i=1 αiyi[(svi)1(5 + 1) + (svi)2(1 + 2)]
2 + b)
= sign(α1y1(47 + 81 + 72)
2 + α2y2(46 + 101 − 42)2+
α3y3(41 + 81 + 2)
2 + α4y4(40 + 91 − 52)2 + b)
= sign(α1y1(2322 + 7521 + 6582 + 112r) + α2y2(2232 + 9201 − 3682 + 80r)+
α3y3(1746 + 6561 + 822 + 16r) + α4y4(1706 + 7201 − 4002 + 90r) + b)
= sign(1.635264− 0.6807791 + 0.0010472 + 0.753025r) = +1
Here, the RAF analysis is able to prove that C is robust on P1(p), since the final RAF has an interval range
[0.200413, 3.070115] which is always positive.
2 Background
Notation. If x,y ∈ Rn, z ∈ R and i ∈ [1, n] then xi = pii(x) ∈ R, x · y ,
∑
i xiyi ∈ R, x + y ∈ Rn,
zx ∈ Rn, ‖x‖2 ,
√
x · x ∈ R, ‖x‖∞ , max{|xi| | i ∈ [1, n]} ∈ R, denote, respectively, i-th component,
dot product, vector addition, scalar multiplication, L2 (i.e., Euclidean) and L∞ (i.e., maximum) norms in Rn. If
h : X → Y is any function then hc : ℘(X)→ ℘(Y ) defined by hc(S) , {h(x) | x ∈ S} denotes the standard
collecting lifting of h, and, when clear from the context, we slightly abuse notation by using h(S) instead of
hc(S).
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Classifiers and Robustness. Consider a training dataset T = {(x1, y1), ..., (xN , yN )} ⊆X×L, whereX ⊆ Rn
is the input space, xi ∈ X is called feature (or attribute) vector and yi is its label (or class) ranging into the
output space L. A supervised learning algorithm SL : ℘(X × L) → (X → L) (also called trainer) computes
a classifier function SL(T ) : X → L ranging in some function subspace (also called hypothesis space). The
learned classifier SL(T ) is a function that best fits the training dataset T according to a principle of empirical
risk minimization. The machine learning algorithm SL computes a classifier SL(T ) by solving a complex
optimization problem. The output space is assumed to be represented by real numbers, i.e., L ⊆ R, and for
binary classifiers with |L| = 2, the standard assumption is that L = {–1,+1}.
The standard threat model [4,11] of untargeted adversarial examples for a generic classifier C : X → L is
as follows. Given a valid input object x ∈ X whose correct label is C(x), an adversarial example for x is a legal
input x′ ∈ X such that x′ is a small perturbation of (i.e., is similar to) x and C(x′) 6= C(x). An adversarial
region is the set of perturbations P (x) ⊆ X that the adversary is allowed to make to x, meaning that a function
P : X → ℘(X) models an adversarial region. A perturbation P (x) is typically modeled by some distance
metric to quantify a similarity to x, usually a p-norm, and the most general model of perturbation simply requires
that for all x ∈ X , x ∈ P (x). A typical distance metric, as considered in [4,10,32], is determined by the L∞
norm: given (a small) δ > 0, P∞δ (x) , {x′ ∈ Rn | ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ δ} = {x′ ∈ Rn | ∀i. x′i ∈ [xi − δ,xi + δ]}.
A classifier C is defined to be robust on an input vector x for an adversarial region P when for all x′ ∈ P (x),
C(x′) = C(x) holds, denoted by Rob(C,x, P ) 4⇔ {C(x′) | x′ ∈ P (x)} = {C(x)}. This means that the
adversary cannot attack the classification of x made by C by selecting input objects from the region P (x).
Support Vector Machines. Several strategies and optimization techniques are available to train a SVM, but they
are not relevant for our purposes ([7] is a popular standard reference for SVMs). A SVM classifier partitions
the input space X into regions, each representing a class of the output space L. In its simplest formulation, the
learning algorithm produces a linear SVM binary classifier with L = {–1,+1} which relies on a hyperplane of
Rn that separates training vectors labeled by –1 from vectors labeled +1. The training phase consists in finding
(i.e., learning) such hyperplane. While many separating hyperplanes may exist, the SVM separating hyperplane
has the maximum distance (called margin) with the closest vectors in the training dataset, because a maximum-
margin learning algorithm statistically reduces the generalization error. This SVM hyperplane is univocally
represented by its normal vector w ∈ Rn and by a displacement scalar b ∈ R, so that the hyperplane equation
is w · x = b. The classification of an input vector x ∈ X therefore boils down to determining the half-space
containing x, namely, the linear binary classifier is the decision function C(x) = sign(w · x − b), where the
case sign(0) = 0 is negligible (e.g. sign(0) may assign the class +1). This linear classifier sign(w · x − b) is
in so-called primal form, while nonlinear classifiers are instead in dual form and based on a so-called kernel
function.
When the training set T cannot be linearly separated in a satisfactory way, T is projected into a much higher
dimensional space through a projection map ϕ : Rn → Rk, with k > n, where ϕ(T ) may become linearly
separable. Training a SVM classifier boils down to a high-dimensional quadratic programming problem which
can be solved either in its primal or dual form. When solving the dual problem, the projection function ϕ is
only involved in dot products ϕ(x) · ϕ(y) in Rk, so that this projection is not actually needed if these dot
products in Rk can be equivalently formulated through a function k : Rn × Rn → R, called kernel function,
such that k(x,y) = ϕ(x) · ϕ(y). Given a dataset T = {(x1, y1), ..., (xN , yN )}, with yi ∈ {–1,+1}, solving
the dual problem for training the SVM classifier means finding a set {αi}Ni=1 ⊆ R, called set of weights, which
maximizes the following function f : RN → R:
max f(α1, ..., αN ) ,
∑N
i=1 αi − 12
∑N
i,j=1 αiαjyiyjk(xi,xj)
subject to: for all i, 0 ≤ αi ≤ c, where c ∈ R>0 is a tuning parameter, and
∑N
i=1 αiyi = 0. This set of weights
defines the following SVM binary classifier C: for all input x ∈ X ⊆ Rn,
C(x) , sign([
∑N
i=1 αiyik(xi,x)]− b) (1)
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for some offset parameter b ∈ R. By defining Dk(x) ,
∑N
i=1 αiyik(xi,x), this classifier will be also denoted
by C(x) = sign(Dk(x)− b). In practice most weights αi are 0, hence only a subset of the training vectors xi is
actually used by the SVM classifierC, and these are called support vectors. By a slight abuse of notation, we will
assume that αi 6= 0 for all i ∈ [1, N ], namely {xi}Ni=1 ⊆ Rn denotes the set of support vectors extracted from
the training set by the SVM learning algorithm for some kernel function. We will consider the most common
and effective kernel functions used in SVM training:
(i) linear kernel: k(x,y) = x · y;
(ii) d-polynomial kernel: k(x,y) = (x · y + c)d (common powers are d = 2, 3, 9);
(iii) Gaussian radial basis function (RBF): k(x,y) = e−γ‖x−y‖
2
2 , for some γ > 0.
SVM Multiclass Classification. Multiclass datasets have a finite set of labelsL = {y1, ..., ym}withm > 2. The
standard approach to multiclass classification problems consists in a reduction into multiple binary classification
problems using one of the following two simple strategies [15]. In the “one-versus-rest” (ovr) strategy,m binary
classifiers are trained, where each binary classifierCi,¯i determines whether an input vector x belongs to the class
yi ∈ L or not by assigning a real confidence score for its decision rather than just a label, so that the class ym
with the highest-output confidence score is the class assigned to x. Multiclass SVMs using this ovr approach
might not work satisfactorily because the ovr approach often leads to unbalanced datasets already for a few
classes due to unbalanced partitions into yi and Lr {yi}.
The most common solution [15] is to follow a “one-versus-one” (ovo) approach, where m(m− 1)/2 binary
classifiers C{i,j} are trained on the restriction of the original training set to vectors with labels in {yi, yj},
with i 6= j, so that each C{i,j} determines whether an input vector belongs (more) to the class yi or (more
to) yj . Given an input vector x ∈ X each of these m(m − 1)/2 binary classifiers C{i,j}(x) assigns a “vote”
to one class in {yi, yj}, and at the end the class with the most votes wins, i.e., the argmax of the function
votes(x, yi) , |{j ∈ {1, ...,m} | j 6= i, C{i,j}(x) = yi}| is the winning class of x. Draw is a downside of
the ovo strategy because it may well be the case that for some (regions of) input vectors multiple classes collect
the same number of votes and therefore no classification can be done. In case of draw, a common strategy
[15] is to output any of the winning classes (e.g., the one with the smaller index). However, since our primary
focus will be on soundness of abstract classifiers, we need to model an ovo multiclass classifier by a function
Movo : X → ℘(L) defined by
Movo(x) , {yk ∈ L | k ∈ argmax
i∈{1,...,m}
votes(x, yi)},
so that |Movo(x)| > 1 models a draw in the ovo voting. Our experiments used SVM multi-classifiers which
have been trained with the ovo voting procedure, which is the standard multi-classification scheme adopted by
the popular Scikit-learn framework [27].
Numerical Abstractions. According to the most general definition, a numerical abstract domain is a tuple
〈A,≤A, γ〉 where 〈A,≤A〉 is at least a preordered set and the concretization function γ : A → ℘(Rn), with
n ≥ 1, preserves the relation ≤A, i.e., a ≤A a′ implies γ(a) ⊆ γ(a′) (i.e., γ is monotone). Thus, A plays
the usual role of set of symbolic representations for sets of vectors of Rn. Well-known examples of numerical
abstract domains include intervals, zonotopes, octagons, convex polyhedra (we refer to the tutorial [24]). Some
numerical domains just form preorders (e.g., standard representations of octagons by DBMs allow multiple
representations) while other domains give rise to posets (e.g., intervals). Of course, any preordered abstract
domain 〈A,≤A, γ〉 can be quotiented to a poset 〈A/∼=,≤A, γ〉 where a ∼= a′ iff a ≤A a′ and a′ ≤A a. While
a monotone concretization γ is enough for reasoning about soundness of static analyses on numerical domains,
the notion of best correct approximation of concrete sets relies on the existence of an abstraction function
α : ℘(Rn) → A which requires that 〈A,≤A〉 is (at least) a poset and that the pair (α, γ) forms a Galois
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connection, i.e. for any X ⊆ Rn, a ∈ A, α(X) ≤A a ⇔ X ⊆ γ(a) holds, which becomes a Galois insertion
when γ is injective (or, equivalently, α is surjective). Several numerical domains admit a definition through
Galois connections, in particular intervals and octagons, while some domains do not have an abstraction map,
notably zonotopes and convex polyhedra.
Consider a concrete k-ary real operation f : ℘(Rn)k → ℘(Rn), for some k ∈ N>0, and a corresponding
abstract map f ] : Ak → A. Then, f ] is a correct (or sound) approximation of f when f ◦ #»γ ⊆ γ ◦ f ]
holds, where #»γ : Ak → ℘(Rn)k denotes the k-th product of γ. Also, f ] is exact (or forward-complete) when
f ◦ #»γ = γ ◦ f ] holds. When a Galois connection (α, γ) for A exists, if f ] is exact then it coincides with the
best correct approximation (bca) of f on A, which is the abstract function α ◦ f ◦ #»γ : Ak → A.
The abstract domain Int of numerical intervals on the poset of real numbers 〈R∪ {–∞,+∞},≤〉 is defined
as usual [6]:
Int , {⊥, [–∞,+∞]} ∪ {[l, u] | l, u ∈ R, l ≤ u} ∪ {[–∞, u] | u ∈ R} ∪ {[l,+∞] | l ∈ R}.
The concretization map γ : Int→ ℘(R) is standard:
γ(⊥) , ∅, γ(>) , R, γ([l, u]) , {x ∈ R | l ≤ x ≤ u},
γ([–∞, u]) , {x ∈ R | x ≤ u}, γ([l,+∞]) , {x ∈ R | l ≤ x}.
Intervals admit an abstraction map α : ℘(R) → Int such that α(X) is the least interval containing X , i.e.,
α(X) , [infX, supX] if X 6= ∅ with infX, supX ∈ R ∪ {–∞,+∞}, while α(∅) = ⊥. Thus, (α, γ) define
a Galois insertion between 〈Int,v〉 and 〈℘(R),⊆〉 w.r.t. the standard interval partial order I v I ′ ⇔ γ(I) ⊆
γ(I ′).
3 Abstract Robustness Verification Framework
Let us describe a sound abstract robustness verification framework for binary and multiclass SVM classifiers.
We first consider a binary classifier C : X → {–1,+1}, where C(x) = sign(D(x) − b) and D : X → R has
been trained for some kernel function k. We also consider a given adversarial region P : X → ℘(X) for C.
Consider a numerical abstract domain 〈A,≤A〉 whose abstract values represent sets of input vectors for a binary
classifier C, namely γ : A→ ℘(X), whereX is the input space of C. We useAn to emphasize thatA is used as
an abstraction of properties of n-dimensional vectors in Rn, so that A1 denotes that A is used as an abstraction
of sets of scalars in ℘(R).
Definition 3.1 (Sound Abstract Classifiers and Robustness Verifiers). A sound abstract binary classifier on
A is an algorithm C] : A→ {–1,+1,>} such that for all a ∈ A, C](a) 6= > ⇒ ∀x ∈ γ(a). C(x) = C](a).
An abstract perturbation is a computable function P ] : X → A. The pair 〈C], P ]〉 is a sound robustness verifier
for C w.r.t. P when for all x ∈ X , if C](P ](x)) = C(x) then Rob(C,x, P ) holds. uunionsq
Hence, a sound abstract classifier C] is allowed to output a “don’t know” answer > on abstract inputs,
but when it provides a classification this must be correct. Also, a sound abstract verifier 〈C], P ]〉 proves the
robustness of an input x when the classification C(x) is preserved by C] on the abstract perturbation P ](x).
The key step for designing an abstract robustness verifier is to design a sound abstract version of the trained
function D : X → R on the abstraction A, namely an algorithm D] : An → A1 such that, for all a ∈ An,
Dc(γ(a)) ⊆ γ(D](a)). We also need that the abstraction A is endowed with a sound approximation of the
Boolean test signb(·) : R → {–1,+1} for any bias b ∈ R, where signb(x) , if x ≥ b then +1 else –1.
Hence, we require a computable abstract function sign]b : A1 → {–1,+1,>} which is sound for signb, that
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is, for all a ∈ A1, sign]b(a) 6= > ⇒ ∀x ∈ γ(a). signb(x) = sign]b(a). These hypotheses therefore provide a
straightforward sound abstract classifier C] : A→ {–1,+1,>} defined as follows:
C](a) , sign]b(D](a)).
Also, the abstract perturbation P ] : X → An has to be a sound approximation of P , meaning that for all x ∈ X ,
P (x) ⊆ γ(P ](x)). It turns out that these hypotheses entail the soundness of the robustness verifier.
Lemma 3.2. C] is a sound abstract classifier and 〈C], P ]〉 is a sound robustness verifier.
Proof. Let a ∈ A and assume that C](a) = sign]b(D](a)) 6= >. Then, by soundness of sign]b, we have that for
all y ∈ γ(D](a)), signb(y) = C](a), and in turn, by soundness of D], for all x ∈ γ(a), signb(D(x)) = C](a).
Let us show that 〈C], P ]〉 is a sound verififer. Let x ∈ X and assume that C](P ](x)) = C(x). Since
C](P ](x)) 6= >, by soundness of C] in point (i), we have that for all x′ ∈ γ(P ](x)), C(x′) = C](P ](x)) =
C(x). Thus, by soundness of P ], for all x′ ∈ P (x), C(x′) = C(x), i.e., Rob(C,x, P ) holds. uunionsq
Thus, if T is a test subset of the dataset used for training the classifier C then we may correctly assert that C
is provably q%-robust on T for the perturbation P when the abstract robustness verification of Lemma 3.2 (ii)
is able to check that C is robust on q% of the test vectors in T . Of course, by soundness, this means that C is
certainly robust on at least q% of the inputs in T , while on the remaining (100 − q)% of T we do not know:
these could be spurious or real unrobust input vectors.
In order to design a sound abstract version of D(x) =
∑N
i=1 αiyik(xi,x) we surely need sound approx-
imations on A1 of scalar multiplication and addition. Thus, we require a sound abstract scalar multiplica-
tion λa.za : A1 → A1, for any z ∈ R, such that for all a ∈ A1, zγ(a) ⊆ γ(za), and a sound addition
+] : A1 ×A1 → A1 such that for all a, a′ ∈ A1, γ(a) + γ(a′) ⊆ γ(a+] a′), and we use
∑]
i∈I ai to denote an
indexed abstract summation.
3.1 Linear Classifiers
Sound approximations of scalar multiplication and addition are enough for designing a sound robustness verifier
for a linear classifier. As a preprocessing step, for a binary classifierC(x) = sign([
∑N
i=1 αiyi(xi ·x)]−b) which
has been trained for the linear kernel, we preliminarly compute the hyperplane normal vector w ∈ Rn: for all
j ∈ [1, n], wj ,
∑N
i=1 αiyixij , so that for all x ∈ Rn, w · x =
∑n
j=1 wjxj =
∑N
i=1 αiyi(xi · x). Thus,
C(x) = sign([
∑n
j=1 wjxj ] − b) is the linear classifier in primal form, whose robustness can be abstractly
verified by resorting to just sound abstract scalar multiplication and addition on A1. The noteworthy advantage
of abstracting a classifier in primal form is that each component of the input vector x occurs just once in
sign([
∑n
j=1 wjxj ] − b), while in the dual form sign([
∑N
i=1 αiyi(xi · x)] − b) each component xj occurs
exactly N times (one for each support vector), so that a precise abstraction of this latter dual form would be
able to represent the correlation between (the many) multiple occurrences of each xj .
3.2 Nonlinear Classifiers
Let us consider a nonlinear kernel binary classifier C(x) = sign(D(x)− b), where D(x) =∑Ni=1 αiyik(xi,x)
and {xi}Ni=1 ⊆ Rn is the set of support vectors for the kernel function k. Thus, what we additionally need
here is a sound abstract kernel function k] : Rn × An → A1 such that for any support vector xi and a ∈ An,
{k(xi,x) | x ∈ γ(a)} ⊆ γ(k](xi, a)). Let us consider the polynomial and RBF kernels.
For a d-polynomial kernel k(x,y) = (x · y + c)d, we need sound approximations of the unary dot product
λy.x · y : Rn → R, for any given x ∈ Rn, and of the d-power function (·)d : R → R. Of course, a sound
nonrelational approximation of λy.x · y =∑nj=1 xjyj can be obtained simply by using sound abstract scalar
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multiplication and addition on A1. Moreover, a sound abstract binary multiplication provides a straightforward
definition of a sound abstract d-power function (·)d] : A1 → A1. If ∗] : A1 × A1 → A1 is a sound abstract
multiplication such that for all a, a′ ∈ A1, γ(a) ∗ γ(a′) ⊆ γ(a ∗] a′), then a sound abstract d-power procedure
can be defined simply by iterating the abstract multiplication ∗] as follows: for any a ∈ A1, d ≥ 2,
ad
] , {r] := a ∗] a; for j := 3 to d do r] := r] ∗] a; return r]}
For the RBF kernel k(x,y) = e−γ‖x−y‖
2
2 = e−γ(x−y)·(x−y), for some γ > 0, we need sound approxima-
tions of the self-dot product λx.x ·x : Rn → R, which is the squared Euclidean distance, and of the exponential
ex : R→ R. Let us observe that sound abstract addition and multiplication induce a sound nonrelational approx-
imation of the self-dot product: for all 〈a1, ..., an〉 ∈ An, 〈a1, ..., an〉 ·] 〈a1, ..., an〉 ,
∑]n
j=1 aj ∗] aj . Finally,
we require a sound abstract exponential e](·) : A1 → A1 such that for all a ∈ A1, {ex | x ∈ γ(a)} ⊆ γ(e]a).
3.3 Abstract Multi-Classification
Let us consider multiclass classification for a set of labels L = {y1, ..., ym}, with m > 2. It turns out that
the multi-classification approaches based on a reduction to multiple binary classifications such as ovr and ovo
introduce a further approximation in the abstraction process, because these reduction strategies need to be
soundly approximated. Let M : X → ℘(L) be a multi-classifier, as modeled in Section 2 and an abstraction A
of ℘(X).
Definition 3.3 (Sound Abstract Multi-Classifiers). A sound abstract multi-classifier on A is an algorithm
M ] : A→ ℘(L) such that for all a ∈ A and x ∈ γ(a), M(x) ⊆M ](a). uunionsq
Thus, an abstract multi-classifier M ] on some a always provides an over-approximation to the classes decided
by M on some input x represented by a, so that an output L plays the role of a “don’t know” answer for M ].
Let us first consider the ovr strategy and, for all j ∈ [1,m], let Cj,j¯ : X → R denote the corresponding
binary scoring classifier of yj-versus-rest where Cj,j¯(x) , Dj(x)− bj . In order to have a sound approximation
of ovr multi-classification, besides having m sound abstract classifiers C]
j,j¯
: An → A1 such that for all
a ∈ An, {Cj,j¯(x) ∈ R | x ∈ γ(a)} ⊆ γ(C]j,j¯(a)), it is needed a sound abstract maximum function max] :
(A1)
m → {1, ...,m,>} such that if (a1, ..., am) ∈ (A1)m and (z1, ..., zm) ∈ γ(a1) × ... × γ(am) then
max](a1, ..., am) 6= > ⇒ max(z1, ..., zm) ∈ γ(amax](a1,...,am)) holds. Clearly, as soon as the abstract
function max] outputs >, this abstract multi-classification scheme is inconclusive.
Example 3.4 Let m = 3 and assume that an ovr multi-classifier Movr is robust on x for some adversarial
region P as a consequence of the following ranges of scores: for all x′ ∈ P (x), −0.5 ≤ C1,1¯(x′) ≤ −0.2,
3.5 ≤ C2,2¯(x′) ≤ 4 and 2 ≤ C3,3¯(x′) ≤ 3.2. In fact, since the least score of C2,2¯ on the region P (x) is greater
than the greatest scores of C1,1¯ and C3,3¯ on P (x), these ranges imply that for all x′ ∈ P (x), M(x′) = y2.
However, even in this advantageous scenario, on the abstract side we could not be able to infer that C2,2¯ always
prevails overC1,1¯ andC3,3¯. For example, for the interval abstraction, some interval binary classifiers for a sound
perturbation P ](x) could output the following sound intervals: C]
1,1¯
(P ](x)) = [−1,−0.1], C]
2,2¯
(P ](x)) =
[3.4, 4.2] and C]
3,3¯
(P ](x)) = [1.5, 3.5]. In this case, despite that each abstract binary classifier C]
i,¯i
is able to
prove that Ci,¯i is robust on x for P (because the output intervals do not include 0), the ovr strategy here does
not allow to conclude that the multi-classifier Movr is robust on x, because the lower bound of the interval
approximation provided by C]
2,2¯
is not above the interval upper bounds of C]
1,1¯
and C]
3,3¯
. In such a case, a sound
abstract multi-classifier based on ovr cannot prove the robustness of Movr for P (x). uunionsq
Let us turn to the ovo approach which relies on m(m− 1)/2 binary classifiers C{i,j} : X → {i, j}. Let us
assume that for all pairs i 6= j, a sound abstract binary classifier C]{i,j} : A → {yi, yj ,>} is defined. Then, an
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abstract ovo multi-classifier M ]ovo : A → ℘(L) can be defined as follows. For all i ∈ {1, ...,m} and a ∈ A, let
votes](a, yi) ∈ IntN be an interval of nonnegative integers used by the following abstract voting procedure AV,
where +Int denotes interval addition:
forall i ∈ [1,m] do votes](a, yi) := [0, 0];
forall i, j ∈ [1,m] s.t. i 6= j do
if C]{i,j}(a) = yi then votes
](a, yi) := votes
](a, yi) +
Int [1, 1]; (2)
elseif C]{i,j}(a) = yj then votes
](a, yj) := votes
](a, yj) +
Int [1, 1];
else votes](a, yi) := votes](a, yi) +Int [0, 1]; votes](a, yj) := votes](a, yj) +Int [0, 1];
Let us notice that the last else branch is taken whenC]{i,j}(a) = >, meaning that the abstract classifierC]{i,j}(a)
is not able to decide between yi and yj , so that in order to preserve the soundness of the abstract voting proce-
dure, we need to increment just the upper bounds of the interval ranges of votes for both classes yi and yj while
their lower bounds do not have to change. Let us denote votes](a, yi) = [vmini , v
max
i ]. Hence, at the end of the
AV procedure, [vmini , v
max
i ] provides an interval approximation of concrete votes as follows:
|{j 6= i | ∀x ∈ γ(a).C{i,j}(x) = i}| = vmini |{j 6= i | ∃x ∈ γ(a).C{i,j}(x) = i}| ≤ vmaxi
The corresponding abstract multi-classifier is then defined as follows:
M ]ovo(a) , {yi ∈ L | ∀j 6= i. vminj ≤ vmaxi } (3)
Hence, one may have an intuition for this definition by considering that a class yj is not in M
]
ovo(a) when
there exists a different class yk whose lower bound of votes is certainly strictly greater than the upper bound of
votes for yi. For example, for m = 4, if votes](a, y1) = [4, 4], votes](a, y2) = [0, 2], votes](a, y3) = [4, 5],
votes](a, y4) = [1, 3] then M
]
ovo(a) = {y1, y3}.
Example 3.5 Assume that m = 3 and that for all x′ ∈ P (x), Movo(x′) = {y3} because we have that
argmaxi=1,2,3 votes(x
′, yi) = {3}. This means that a draw never happens for Movo, so that for all x′ ∈
P (x), C{1,3}(x′) = y3 and C{2,3}(x′) = y3 certainly hold (because m = 3). Let us also assume that
{C{1,2}(x′) | x′ ∈ P (x)} = {y1, y2}. Then, for a sound abstract perturbation P ](x), we necessarily have
that C]{1,2}(P
](x)) = >. If we assume that C]{1,3}(P ](x)) = y3 and C]{2,3}(P ](x)) = > hold then we
have that M ]ovo(P ](x)) = {y1, y2, y3} because votes(P ](x), y1) = [0, 1], votes(P ](x), y2) = [0, 2] and
votes(P ](x), y3) = [1, 2]. Therefore, in this case, M
]
ovo is not able to prove the robustness of Movo on x. Let us
notice that the source of imprecision in this multi-classification is confined to the binary classifier C]2,3 rather
than the abstract voting AV strategy. In fact, if we have that C]{1,3}(P
](x)) = {y3} and C]{2,3}(P ](x)) = {y3}
then M ]ovo(P ](x)) = {y3}, thus proving the robustness of M . uunionsq
Lemma 3.6. Let Movo be an ovo multi-classifier based on binary classifiers C{i,j}. If the abstract multi-
classifier M ]ovo defined in (3) is based on sound abstract binary classifiers C
]
{i,j} then M
]
ovo is sound for Movo.
Proof. Let a ∈ A, x ∈ γ(a), and let us prove that Movo(x) ⊆ M ]ovo(a). By soundness of all the binary
classifiers C]{i,j}, we have that for all k ∈ [1,m], if votes](a, yk) = [vmink , vmaxk ] then vmink = |{i ∈ [1,m] | i 6=
k,C]{i,k}(a) = yk}| ≤ |{i ∈ [1,m] | i 6= k,C{i,k}(x) = yk}| and vmaxk = |{i ∈ [1,m] | i 6= k,C]{i,k}(a) ∈
{yk,>}}| ≥ |{i ∈ [1,m] | i 6= k,C{i,k}(x) = yk}|. Thus, for all i ∈ [1,m], vmini ≤ votes(x, yi) ≤
vmaxi . Consequently, if yi ∈ Movo(x) then i is a maximum argument for votes(x, y(·)), so that for all j 6= i,
votes(x, yj) ≤ votes(x, yi). Hence, for all j 6= i, vminj ≤ votes(x, yj) ≤ votes(x, yi) ≤ vmaxi , thus meaning
that yi ∈M ]ovo(a). uunionsq
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In our experimental evaluation we will follow the ovo approach for concrete multi-classification, which is
standard for SVMs [15], and consequently we will use this abstract ovo multi-classifier in (3) for robustness
verification.
3.4 On the Completeness
Let C : X → {–1,+1} be a binary classifier, P : X → ℘(X) a perturbation and C] : A → {–1,+1,>},
P ] : X → A be a corresponding sound abstract binary classifier and perturbation on an abstraction A. An
abstract classifier can be used as a complete robustness verifier when it is also able to prove unrobustness.
Definition 3.7 (Complete Abstract Classifiers and Robustness Verifiers). C] is complete for C when for all
a ∈ A, C](a) = > ⇒ ∃x,x′ ∈ γ(a). C(x) 6= C(x′).
〈C], P ]〉 is a (sound and) complete robustness verifier for C w.r.t. P when for all x ∈ X , C](P ](x)) = C(x)
iff Rob(C,x, P ). uunionsq
Complete abstract classifiers can be obtained for linear binary classifiers once these linear classifiers are
in primal form and the abstract operations are exact. As discussed in Section 3, we therefore consider a linear
binary classifier in primal form Cpr(x) , signb(
∑n
j=1 wjpij(x)) and an abstraction A of ℘(X) with γ : A →
℘(X). Let us consider the following exactness conditions for the abstract functions on A needed for abstracting
Cpr and the perturbation P :
(E1) Exact projection pi
]
j : For all j ∈ [1, n] and a ∈ An, γ(pi]j(a)) = pij(γ(a));
(E2) Exact scalar multiplication: For all z ∈ R and a ∈ A1, γ(za) = zγ(a);
(E3) Exact scalar addition +]: For all a, a′ ∈ A1, γ(a+] a′) = γ(a) + γ(a′);
(E4) Exact sign
]
b: For all b ∈ R, a ∈ A1, (∀x ∈ γ(a). signb(x) = s)⇒ sign]b(a) = s;
(E5) Exact perturbation P ]: For all x ∈ X , γ(P ](x)) = P (x).
Then, it turns out that the abstract classifier
C]pr(a) , sign]b(
∑]n
j=1 wjpi
]
j(a)) (4)
is complete and induces a complete robustness verifier.
Lemma 3.8. Under hypotheses (E1)-(E5), C]pr in (4) is (sound and) complete for Cpr and 〈C]pr, P ]〉 is a com-
plete robustness verifier for Cpr w.r.t. P .
Proof. Let a ∈ A and assume that C]pr(a) = sign]b(
∑]n
j=1 wjpi
]
j(a)) = >. Then, by (E4), we have that there
exist α < 0 and β ≥ 0 such that [α, β] ⊆ γ(∑]ni=1 wjpij(a)). By (E1), (E2), (E3), γ(∑]ni=1 wjpij(a)) =
{∑ni=1 wjpij(x) | x ∈ γ(a)}. Thus, there exist x,x′ ∈ γ(a) such that∑ni=1 wjpij(x) = α and∑ni=1 wjpij(x′)
= β, implying that Cpr(x) = –1 and Cpr(x′) = +1. Thus, C]pr is complete.
Let us now prove in general that if C] is sound and complete and P ] is exact then 〈C], P ]〉 is a complete
robustness verifier. Let x ∈ X and assume that for all x′ ∈ P (x), C(x) = C(x′). Then, by (E5), for all
x′ ∈ γ(P ](x)), C(x) = C(x′), so that, by completeness, C](P ](x)) 6= >. Since P (x) = γ(P ](x)) 6= ∅, by
soundness of C], there is some x′ ∈ P (x), such that C](P ](x)) = C(x′) = C(x). uunionsq
Let us now focus on multi-classification. It turns out that completeness does not scale from binary to multi-
classification, that is, even if all the abstract binary classifiers are assumed to be complete, the corresponding
abstract multi-classification could lose the completeness. This loss is not due to the abstraction of the binary
classifiers, but it is an intrinsic issue of a multi-classification approach based on binary classification. Let us
show how this loss for ovr and ovo can happen through some examples.
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Example 3.9 Consider L = {y1, y2, y3} and assume that for some x,x′ ∈ X , the scoring ovr binary classifiers
Cyi,yi are as follows: Cy1,y1(x) = 3, Cy2,y2(x) = −1, Cy3,y3(x) = 2, Cy1,y1(x′) = 1, Cy2,y2(x′) = −1,
Cy3,y3(x) = 0.5. Hence, Movr(x) = Movr(x
′) = {y1}, meaning that Movr is robust on x for a perturba-
tion P (x) = {x,x′}. However, it turns out that the mere collecting abstraction of binary classifiers Cyi,yi ,
although being trivially complete according to Definition 3.7 may well lead to a (sound but) incomplete multi-
classification. In fact, even if we consider no abstraction of sets of vectors/scalars and an abstract binary classifier
is simply defined by collecting abstractionC]yi,yi(Y ) , {Cyi,yi(x) ∈ R | x ∈ Y }, then we have that while each
C]yi,yi is complete the corresponding abstract ovr multi-classifier turns out to be sound but not complete. In our
example, we have that: C]y1,y1(P (x)) = {1, 3}, Cy2,y2(P (x)) = {−1,−1}, Cy3,y3(P (x)) = {0.5, 2}. Hence,
the ovr strategy can only derive that both y1 and y2 are feasible classes for P (x), namely, M
]
ovr({x,x′}) =
{y1, y2}, meaning that M ]ovr cannot prove the robustness of M . uunionsq
The above example shows that the loss of relational information between input vectors and corresponding
scores is an unavoidable source of incompleteness when abstracting ovr multi-classification. An analogous
incompleteness happens in ovo multi-classification.
Example 3.10 Consider L = {y1, y2, y3, y4, y5} and assume that for some x,x′ ∈ X , the ovo binary classifiers
C{i,j} give the following outputs:
C{1,2} C{1,3} C{1,4} C{1,5} C{2,3} C{2,4} C{2,5} C{3,4} C{3,5} C{4,5}
x y1 y1 y1 y5 y2 y2 y5 y3 y3 y4
x′ y1 y1 y4 y1 y2 y4 y2 y3 y5 y5
so that Movo(x) = Movo(x′) = {y1}, meaning that Movo is robust on x for the perturbation P (x) = {x,x′}.
Similarly to Example 3.9, the collecting abstractions of binary classifiers Cyi,yj are trivially complete but define
a (sound but) incomplete multi-classification. In fact, even with no numerical abstraction, if we consider the
abstract collecting binary classifiers C]{yi,yj}(Y ) , {C{yi,yj}(x) | x ∈ Y } then we have that:
C{1,2} C{1,3} C{1,4} C{1,5} C{2,3} C{2,4} C{2,5} C{3,4} C{3,5} C{4,5}
P (x) {y1} {y1} {y1, y4} {y1, y5} {y2} {y2, y4} {y2, y5} {y3} {y3, y5} {y4, y5}
Thus, the ovo voting for P (x) in order to be sound necessarily has to assign 4 votes to both classes y1 and
y5, meaning that M
]
ovo(P (x)) = {y1, y5}. As a consequence, M ]ovr cannot prove the robustness of Movo. Here
again, this is a consequence of the collecting abstraction which looses the relational information between input
vectors and corresponding classes, and therefore is an ineluctable source of incompleteness when abstracting
ovo multi-classification. uunionsq
Let us observe that when all the abstract binary classifiers C]{i,j} are complete, then in the abstract voting
procedure AV in (2), for all votes](a, yi) = [vmini , v
max
i ], we have that |{j 6= i | ∃x ∈ γ(a).C{i,j}(x) = i}| =
vmaxi holds, meaning that the hypothesis of completeness of abstract binary classifiers strengthens the upper
bound vmaxi to a precise equality, although this is not enough for preserving the completeness.
4 Numerical Abstractions for Classifiers
4.1 Interval Abstraction
The n-dimensional interval abstraction domain Intn is simply defined as a nonrelational product of Int, i.e.,
Intn , Intn (with Int1 = Int), where γIntn : Intn → ℘(Rn) is defined by γIntn(I1, ..., In) , ×ni=1γInt(Ii),
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and, by a slight abuse of notation, this concretization map will be denoted simply by γ. In order to abstract
linear and nonlinear classifiers, we will use the following standard interval operations based on real arithmetic
operations.
– Projection pij : Intn → Int defined by pij(I1, ..., In) , Ij , which is trivially exact because Intn is nonrela-
tional.
– Scalar multiplication λI.zI : Intn → Intn, with z ∈ R, is defined as componentwise extension of scalar
multiplication λI.zI : Int1 → Int1 given by: z⊥ = ⊥ and z[l, u] , [zl, zu], where z(±∞) = ±∞ for
z 6= 0 and 0(±∞) = 0. This is an exact abstract scalar multiplication, i.e., {zx | x ∈ γ(I)} = γ(zI) holds.
– Addition +] : Intn × Intn → Intn is defined as componentwise extension of standard interval addition,
that is, ⊥ +] I = ⊥ = I +] ⊥, [l1, u1] +] [l2, u2] = [l1 + l2, u1 + u2]. This abstract interval addition is
exact, i.e., {x1 + x2 | xi ∈ γ(Ii)} = γ(I1 +] I2) holds.
– One-dimensional multiplication ∗] : Int1 × Int1 → Int1 is enough for our purposes, whose definition is
standard:⊥∗]I = ⊥ = I∗]⊥, [l1, u1]∗][l2, u2] = [min(l1l2, l1u2, u1l2, u1u2),max(l1l2, l1u2, u1l2, u1u2)].
As a consequence of the completeness of real numbers, this abstract interval multiplication is exact, i.e.,
{x1x2 | xi ∈ γ(Ii)} = γ(I1 ∗] I2).
It is worth remarking that since all these abstract functions on real intervals are exact and real intervals have
the abstraction map, it turns out that all these abstract functions are the best correct approximations on intervals
of the corresponding concrete functions.
For the exponential function ex : R → R used by RBF kernels, let us consider a generic real function
f : R→ R which is assumed to be continuous and monotonically either increasing (x ≤ y ⇒ f(x) ≤ f(y)) or
decreasing (x ≤ y ⇒ f(x) ≥ f(y)). Its collecting lifting f c : ℘(R) → ℘(R) is approximated on the interval
abstraction by the abstract function f ] : Int1 → Int1 defined as follows: for all possibly unbounded intervals
[l, u] with l, u ∈ R ∪ {–∞,+∞},
fi([l, u]) , inf{f(x) ∈ R | x ∈ γ([l, u])} ∈ R ∪ {–∞}
fs([l, u]) , sup{f(x) ∈ R | x ∈ γ([l, u])} ∈ R ∪ {+∞}
f ]([l, u]) , [min(fi([l, u]), fs([l, u])),max(fi([l, u]), fs([l, u])] f ](⊥) , ⊥
Thus, for bounded intervals [l, u] with l, u ∈ R, f ]([l, u]) = [min(f(l), f(u)), max(f(l), f(u))]. As a conse-
quence of the hypotheses of continuity and monotonicity of f , it turns out that this abstract function f ] is exact,
i.e., {f(x) ∈ R | x ∈ γ([l, u])} = γ(f ]([l, u])) holds, and it is the best correct approximation on intervals of
f c.
4.2 Reduced Affine Arithmetic Abstraction
Even if all the abstract functions of the interval abstraction are exact, it is well known that the compositional
abstract evaluation of an inductively defined expression e on Int can be imprecise due to the dependency prob-
lem, meaning that if the syntactic expression e includes multiple occurrences of a variable x and the abstract
evaluation of e is performed by structural induction on e, then each occurrence of x in e is taken indepen-
dently from the others and this can lead to a significant loss of precision in the output interval. This loss of
precision may happen both for addition and multiplication of intervals. For example, the abstract composi-
tional evaluations of the simple expressions x − x and x ∗ x on an input interval [−c, c], with c ∈ R>0,
yield, respectively, [−2c, 2c] and [−c2, c2], rather than the exact results [0, 0] and [0, c2]. This dependency prob-
lem can be a significant source of imprecision for the interval abstraction of a polynomial SVM classifier
C(x) = sign([
∑N
i=1 αiyi(
∑n
j=1(yi)jxj + c)
d] − b), where each attribute xj of an input vector x occurs for
each support vector yi. The classifiers based on RBF kernel show an analogous issue.
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Affine Forms. Affine arithmetic [35,36] mitigates this dependency problem of the nonrelational interval ab-
straction. An interval [l, u] ∈ Int which approximates the range of some variable x is represented by an affine
form (AF) xˆ = a0 + a1x, where a0 = (l + u)/2, a1 = (u − l)/2 and x is a symbolic (or “noise”) real
variable ranging in [−1, 1] ∈ Int which explicitly represents a dependence from the parameter x. This solves
the dependency problem for a linear expression such as x − x because the interval [−c, c] for x is represented
by 0+ cx so that the compositional evaluation of x− x for 0+ cx becomes (0 + cx)− (0 + cx) = 0, while
for nonlinear expressions such as x ∗ x, an approximation is still needed.
In general, the domain AFk of affine forms with k ≥ 1 noise variables consists of affine forms aˆ = a0 +∑k
i=1 aii, where ai ∈ R and each i represents either an external dependence from some input variable or an
internal approximation dependence due to a nonlinear operation. An affine form aˆ ∈ AFk can be abstracted to
a real interval in Int, as given by a map αInt : AFk → Int defined as follows: for all aˆ = a0 +
∑k
i=1 aii ∈
AFk, αInt(aˆ) , [caˆ − rad(aˆ), caˆ + rad(aˆ)], where caˆ , a0 and rad(eˆ) ,
∑k
i=1 |ai| are called, resp., center
and radius of the affine form aˆ. This, in turn, defines the interval concretization γAFk : AFk → R given by
γAFk(aˆ) , γIntR(αInt(aˆ)) = {x ∈ R | caˆ − rad(aˆ) ≤ x ≤ caˆ + rad(aˆ)}.
Vectors of affine forms may be used to represent zonotopes, which are center-symmetric convex polytopes
and have been used to design an abstract domain for static program analysis [14] endowed with abstract func-
tions, joins and widening.
Reduced Affine Forms. It turns out that affine forms are exact for linear operations, namely additions and scalar
multiplications. If aˆ, bˆ ∈ AFk, where aˆ = a0 +
∑k
j=1 ajj and bˆ = b0 +
∑k
j=1 bjj , and c ∈ R then abstract
additions and scalar multiplications are defined as follows:
aˆ+] bˆ , (a0 + b0) +
∑k
j=1(aj + bj)j caˆ , ca0 +
∑k
j=1 cajj .
These abstract operations are exact, namely, {x + y ∈ R | x ∈ γAFk(aˆ), y ∈ γAFk(bˆ)} = γAFk(aˆ +] bˆ) and
cγAFk(aˆ) = γAFk(caˆ).
For nonlinear operations, in particular multiplication, in general the result cannot be represented exactly by
an affine form. Then, the standard strategy for defining the multiplication of affine forms is to approximate the
precise result by adding a fresh noise symbol whose coefficient is typically computed by a Taylor or Chebyshev
approximation of the nonlinear part of the multiplication (cf. [14, Section 2.1.5]). Similarly, for the exponential
function used in RBF kernels, an algorithm for computing an affine approximation of the exponential ex evalu-
ated on an affine form xˆ for the exponent x is given in [35, Section 3.11] and is based on an optimal Chebyshev
approximation (that is, w.r.t. L∞ distance) of the exponential which introduces a fresh noise symbol. However,
the need of injecting a fresh noise symbol for each nonlinear operation raises a critical space and time complex-
ity issue for abstracting polynomial and RBF classifiers, because this would imply that a new but useless noise
symbol should be added for each support vector. For example, for a 2-polynomial classifier, we need to approx-
imate a square operation x ∗ x for each of the N support vectors, and a blind usage of abstract multiplication
for affine forms would add N different and useless noise symbols. This drawback would be even worse for for
d-polynomial classifers with d > 2, while an analogous critical issue would happen for RBF classifiers. This
motivates the use of so-called reduced affine forms (RAFs), which have been introduced in [22] as a remedy
for the increase of noise symbols due to nonlinear operations and still allow us to keep track of correlations
between the components of the input vectors of classifiers.
A reduced affine form a˜ ∈ RAFk of length k ≥ 1 is defined as a sum of a standard affine form in AFk with
a specific rounding noise a which accumulates all the errors introduced by nonlinear operations. Thus,
RAFk , {a0 +
∑k
j=1 ajj + ara | a0, a1, ..., ak ∈ R, ar ∈ R≥0}.
The key point is that the length of a˜ ∈ RAFk remains unchanged during the whole abstract computation and
ar ∈ R≥0 is the radius of the accumulative error of approximating all nonlinear operations during abstract
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computations. Of course, each a˜ ∈ RAFk can be viewed as a standard affine form in AFk+1 and this allows us
to define the interval concretization γRAFk(a˜) and the linear abstract operations of addition and scalar multipli-
cation of RAFs simply by considering them as standard affine forms. In particular, linear abstract operations in
RAFk are exact w.r.t. interval concretization γRAFk .
Nonlinear abstract operations, such as multiplication, must necessarily be approximated for RAFs. Several
algorithms of abstract multiplication of RAFs are available, which differ in precision, approximation principle
and time complexity, ranging from linear to quadratic complexities [33, Section 3]. Given a˜, b˜ ∈ RAFk, we
need to define an abstract multiplication a˜∗] b˜ ∈ RAFk which is sound, namely, {xy ∈ R | x ∈ γRAFk(a˜), y ∈
γRAFk(b˜)} ⊆ γRAFk(a˜ ∗] b˜), where it is worth pointing out that this soundness condition is given w.r.t. interval
concretization γRAFk and scalar multiplication. Time complexity is a crucial issue for using ∗] in abstract poly-
nomial and RBF kernels, because in these abstract classifiers at least an abstract multiplication must be used
for each support vector, so that quadratic time algorithms in O(k2) cannot scale when the number of support
vectors grows, as expected for realistic training datasets. We therefore selected a recent linear time algorithm by
Skalna and Hladı´k [33] which is optimal in the following sense. Given a˜, b˜ ∈ RAFk, we have that their concrete
symbolic multiplication is as follows:
a˜ ∗ b˜ = (a0 +
∑k
j=1 ajj + ara) ∗ (b0 +
∑k
j=1 bjj + brb)
= a0b0 +
∑k
j=1(a0bj + b0aj)j + (a0brb + b0ara) + fa˜,b˜(1, ..., k, a, b)
where fa˜,b˜(1, ..., k, a, b) , (
∑k
j=1 ajj+ara)(
∑k
j=1 bjj+brb). An abstract multiplication ∗]e on RAFk
can be defined as follows: if Rmax, Rmin ∈ R are, resp., the minimum and maximum of {fa˜,b˜(e) ∈ R | e ∈
[−1, 1]k+2} then
a˜ ∗]e b˜ , a0b0 + 0.5(Rmax +Rmin) +
∑k
j=1(a0bj + b0aj)j + (|a0|br + |b0|ar + 0.5(Rmax −Rmin))a∗b
where 0.5(Rmax + Rmin) and 0.5(Rmax − Rmin) are, resp., the center and the radius of the interval range of
fa˜,b˜(1, ..., k, a, b). As argued in [33, Proposition 3], this defines an optimal abstract multiplication of RAFs.
Skalna and Hladı´k [33] put forward two algorithms for computing Rmax and Rmin, one with O(k) time bound
and one in O(k log k): the O(k) bound is obtained by relying on a linear time algorithm to find a median of a
sequence of real numbers, while the O(k log k) algorithm is based on (quick)sorting that sequence of numbers.
The details of these algorithms are here omitted and can be found in [33, Section 4]. In abstract interpretation
terms, it turns out that this abstract multiplication algorithm ∗]e of RAFs provides the best approximation among
the RAFs which correctly approximate the multiplication with the same coefficients for 1,...,k of a˜ ∗]e b˜:
Finally, let us consider the exponential function ex used in RBF kernels. The algorithm in [35, Section 3.11]
for computing the affine form approximation of ex and based on Chebyshev approximation of ex can be also
applied when the exponent is represented by a RAF x˜ = x0 +
∑k
j=1 xjj + xrx ∈ RAFk, provided that the
radius of the fresh noise symbol produced by computing ex˜ is added to the coefficient of the rounding noise x
of x˜.
4.3 Floating Point Soundness
The interval abstraction, the reduced affine form abstraction and the corresponding abstract functions described
in Section 4 rely on precise real arithmetic on R, in particular soundness and exactness of abstract functions
depend on real arithmetic. It turns out that these abstract functions may yield unsound results for floating point
arithmetic such as the standard IEEE 754 [34]. This issue has been investigated in static program analysis by
Mine´ [23] who showed how to adapt the interval abstraction and, more in general, a numerical abstract domain
to IEEE 754-compliant floating point numbers in order to design “floating point sound” abstract functions. Let
〈F,≤〉 denote the poset F of floating point numbers, where we refer to the technical standard IEEE 754 [34].
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The basic step is the rounding of a scalar c ∈ R towards –∞, denoted by c−, and towards +∞, denoted by c+,
where c−∈ F (c+∈ F) is the greatest (least) floating-point number in 〈F,≤〉 smaller (greater) than or equal to c.
This floating-point rounding allows to define abstract operations on intervals of numbers in Fwhich are floating-
point sound [23, Section 4]. For example, if [l1, u1], [l2, u2] ∈ IntF are two intervals of floating-point numbers
then their floating point addition is defined by [l1, u1]+
]
f [l2, u2] , [(l1 + u1)−, (l2 + u2)+] and this operation
is floating-point sound because γ([l1, u1]+][l2, u2]) ⊆ γ([l1, u1]+]f [l2, u2]). A number of software packages
for sound floating-point arithmetic are available, such as the GNU MPFR C library [9] used in the well-known
library of numerical abstract domains Apron [18]. For efficiency reasons, our prototype implementation simply
uses the standard C fesetround() function for floating-point rounding [17, Section 7.6] in all the definitions of
our floating-point sound abstract functions, both for intervals and RAFs.
5 Verifying SVM Classifiers
5.1 Perturbations
We consider robustness of SVM classifiers against a standard adversarial region defined by the L∞ norm, as
considered in Carlini and Wagner’s robustness model [4] and used by Vechev et al. [10,31,32] in their verifi-
cation framework. Given a generic classifier C : X → L and a constant δ ∈ R>0, a L∞ δ-perturbation of an
input vector x ∈ Rn is defined by P∞δ (x) , {x′ ∈ X | ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ δ}. Thus, if the space X consists of
n-dimensional real vectors normalized in [0, 1] (our datasets follow this standard) and δ ∈ (0, 1] then
P∞δ (x) = {x′ ∈ Rn | ∀i. x′i ∈ [xi − ,xi + ] ∩ [0, 1]}.
Let us observe that, for all x, P∞δ (x) is an exact perturbation for intervals and therefore for RAFs as well (cf.
(E5)). The datasets of our experiments consist of h×w grayscale images where each image is represented as
a real vector in [0, 1]hw whose components encode the light values of pixels. Thus, increasing (decreasing) the
value of a vector component means brightening (darkening) that pixel, so that a perturbation P∞δ (x) of an image
x represents all the images where every possible subset of pixels is brightened or darkened up to δ.
We also consider robustness of image classifiers for the so-called adversarial framing on the border of
images, which has been recently shown to represent an effective attack for deep convolutional networks [44].
Consider an image represented as a h × w matrix M ∈ Rh,w with normalized real values in [0, 1]. Given an
integer framing thickness t ∈ [1,min(h,w)/2], the “occlude” t-framing perturbation of M is defined by
P frmt (M) , {M ′ ∈ Rh,w | ∀i ∈ [t+ 1, h− t], j ∈ [w + 1, w − t].M ′i,j =Mi,j ,
∀i 6∈ [t+ 1, h− t], j 6∈ [w + 1, w − t].M ′i,j ∈ [0, 1]}.
This framing perturbation models the uniformly distributed random noise attack in [44]. Also in this case
P frmt (M) is a perturbation which can be exactly represented by intervals and consequently by RAFs. An exam-
ple of image taken from the Fashion-MNIST dataset together with two brightnening and darkening perturbations
and a frame perturbation of thickness 2 is given in the figure below.
(1) Original imagem (2) Darkening in P∞0.25(m) (3) Brightening in P∞0.25(m) (4) Framing in P frm2 (m)
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5.2 Linear Classifiers
As observed in Section 4, for the interval abstraction it turns out that all the abstract functions which are
used in abstract linear binary classifiers in primal form (cf. Section 3) are exact, so that, by Lemma 3.8,
these abstract linear binary classifiers are complete. This completeness implies that there is no need to re-
sort to the RAF abstraction for linear binary classifiers. However, as argued in Section 3, this completeness
for binary classifiers does not scale to multi-classification. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that for each
binary classifier C{i,j} used in ovo multi-classification, since L∞ and frame perturbations are exact for inter-
vals, we have a complete robustness verifier for each C{i,j}. As a consequence, this makes feasible to find
adversarial examples of linear binary classifiers as follows. Let us consider a linear binary classifier in pri-
mal form C(x) = sign([
∑n
j=1 wjxj ] − b) and a perturbation P which is exact on intervals, i.e., for all x,
P (x) = γIntn(P
](x)), where P ](x) = 〈[l1, u1], ..., [ln, un]〉) ∈ Intn. Completeness of robustness linear verifi-
cation means that if the interval abstraction
∑]n
j=1 wj [lj , uj ] outputs an interval [l, u] ∈ Int1 such that 0 ∈ [l, u],
then C is surely not robust on x for P . It is then easy to find two input vectors y, z ∈ P (x) which provide a
concrete counterexample to the robustness, namely such that C(y) 6= C(z). For all i ∈ [1, n], if we define:
yi , if sign(wi) ≥ 0 then ui else li zi , if sign(wi) ≥ 0 then li else ui
then we have found y, z ∈ P (x) such that ∑nj=1 wjyj = u and ∑nj=1 wjzj = l, so that C(y) = +1
and C(z) = –1. The pair of input vectors (y, z) therefore represents the strongest adversarial example to the
robustness of C on x.
5.3 Nonlinear Classifiers
Let us first point out that interval and RAF abstractions are incomparable for nonlinear operations.
Example 5.1 Consider the 2-polynomial in two variables f(x1, x2) = (1+2x1−x2)2− 14 (2+x1+x2)2, which
could be thought of as a 2-polynomial classifier in R2. Assume that x1 and x2 range in the interval [−1, 1]. The
abstract evaluation of f on the intervals Ix1 = [−1, 1] = Ix2 is as follows:
f ]Int(Ix1 , Ix2) = (1 + 2[−1, 1]− [−1, 1])2 − 14 (2 + [−1, 1] + [−1, 1])2
= [−2, 4]2 − 14 [0, 4]2 = [0, 16] + [−4, 0] = [−4, 16]
On the other hand, for the RAF2 abstraction we have that x˜1 = 1 and x˜2 = 2 and the abstract evaluation of f
is as follows:
f ]RAF2(x˜1, x˜2) = (1 + 21 − 2)2 − 14 (2 + 1 + 2)2
= [1 + 0.5(R1 max +R1 min) + 41 − 22 + 0.5(R1 max −R1 min)r]−
1
4 [4 + 0.5(R2 max +R2 min) + 41 + 42 + 0.5(R2 max −R2 min)r]
where R1 max = max((21 − 2)2) = 9, R1 min = min((21 − 2)2) = 0,
R2 max = max((1 + 2)
2) = 4, R2 min = min((1 + 2)
2) = 0
= [5.5 + 41 − 22 + 4.5r]− 14 [6 + 41 + 42 + 2r]
= [5.5 + 41 − 22 + 4.5r] + [−1.5− 1 − 2 − 0.5r]
= 4 + 31 − 32 + 4r
Thus, it turns out that γRAF2(f
]
RAF2
(x˜1, x˜2)) = [4 − 10, 4 + 10] = [−6, 14], which is incomparable with
γInt(f
]
Int(Ix1 , Ix2)) = [−4, 16]. uunionsq
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By taking into account Example 5.1, for a nonlinear binary classifier C(x) = sign(D(x) − b), with
D(x) =
∑N
i=1 αiyik(xi,x), we will use both the interval and RAF abstractions of C in order to com-
bine their final abstract results. More precisely, if D]Intn and D
]
RAFn
are, resp., the interval and RAF ab-
stractions of D, assume that P : X → ℘(X) is a perturbation for C which is soundly approximated by
P ]Int : X → Intn on intervals and by P ]RAF : X → RAFn on RAFs, so that P ] : X → Intn×RAFn is defined
by P ](x) , 〈P ]Int(x), P ]RAF(x)〉. Then, for each input vector x ∈ X , our combined verifier first will run both
D]Intn(P
]
Int(x)) and D
]
RAFn
(P ]RAF(x)). Next, the output D
]
RAFn
(P ]RAF(x)) = aˆ ∈ RAFn is abstracted to the
interval [caˆ−rad(aˆ), caˆ+rad(aˆ)] which is then intersected with the intervalD]Intn(P
]
Int(x)) = [l, u]. Summing
up, our combined abstract binary classifier C] : Intn × RAFn → {–1,+1,>} is defined as follows:
C](P ](x)) ,

+1 if max(l, caˆ − rad(aˆ)) ≥ 0
–1 if min(u, caˆ + rad(aˆ)) < 0
> otherwise
As shown in Section 4, it turns out that all the linear and nonlinear abstract operations for polynomial and RBF
kernels are sound, so that by Lemma 3.2, this combined abstract classifier C] induces a sound robustness verifer
for C. Finally, for multi-classification, in both linear and nonlinear cases, we will use the sound abstract ovo
multi-classifier defined in Lemma 3.6.
6 Experimental Results
We implemented our robustness verification method for SVM classifiers in a tool called SAVer (Svm Abstract
Verifier), which has been written in C (approximately 2.5k LOC) and is available open source in GitHub [30]
together with all the datasets, trained SVMs and results. We benchmark the percentage of samples of the full test
sets for which a SVM classifier is proved to be robust (and, dually, vulnerable) for a given perturbation, as well
as the average verification times per sample. We also evaluated the impact of using subsets of the training set
on the robustness of the corresponding classifiers and on verification times. We compared SAVer to DeepPoly
[32], a robustness verification tool for convolutional deep neural networks based on abstract interpretation. Our
experimental results indicate that SAVer is fast and scalable and that the percentage of robustness provable by
SAVer for SVMs is significantly higher than the robustness provable by DeepPoly for deep neural networks.
Our experiments for proving the robustness were run on a Intel Xeon E5520 2.27GHz CPU, while the time
measures used a AMD Ryzen 7 1700X 3.0GHz CPU.
6.1 Datasets and Classifiers
For our experimental evaluation of SAVer we used the widespread and standard MNIST [21] image dataset
together and the recent alternative Fashion-MNIST (F-MNIST) dataset [42]. They both contain grayscale im-
ages of 28×28=784 pixels which are represented as normalized vectors of floating-point numbers in [0, 1]784.
MNIST contains images of handwritten digits, while F-MNIST comprises professional images of fashion dress
products from 10 categories taken from the popular Zalando’s e-commerce website. F-MNIST has been recently
put forward as a more challenging alternative for the original MNIST dataset for benchmarking machine learn-
ing algorithms, since the extensive experimental results reported in [42] showed that the test accuracy of most
machine learning classifiers significantly decreases (a rough average is about 10%) from MNIST to F-MNIST.
In particular, [42] reports that the average test accuracy (on the whole test set) of linear, polynomial and RBF
SVMs on MNIST is 95.4% while for F-MNIST drops to 87.4%, where RBF SVMs are reportedly the most
precise classifiers on F-MNIST with an accuracy of 89.7%. Both datasets include a training set of 60000 images
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and a test set of 10000 images, with no overlap. Our tests are run on the whole test set, where, following [32],
these 10000 images of MNIST and F-MNIST have been filtered out of those misclassified by the SVMs (rang-
ing from 3% of RBF and polynomial kernels to 7% for linear kernel), while the experiments comparing SAVer
with DeepPoly are conducted on the same test subset. We trained a number of SVM classifiers using different
subsets of the training sets and different kernel functions. We trained our SVMs with linear, RBF and (2, 3 and
9 degrees) polynomial kernels, and in order to benchmark the scalability of the verifiers we used the first 1k, 2k,
4k, 8k, 16k, 30k, 60k samples of the training set (training times never exceeded 3 hours). For training we used
Scikit-learn [27], a popular machine learning library for Python, which relies on the standard Libsvm C library
[5] implementing the ovo approach for multi-classification.
6.2 Results
The results of our experimental evaluation are summarized by the charts (a)-(h) and tables (a)-(c) below.
Charts (a)-(f) refer to the dataset MNIST, while charts (g)-(h) compare MNIST and F-MNIST. Chart (a) com-
pares the provable robustness to a P∞δ adversarial region of SVMs which have been trained with different
kernels. It turns out that the RBF classifier is the most provably robust and is therefore taken as reference clas-
sifier for the successive charts. Chart (b) compares the relative precision of robustness verification which can be
obtained by changing the abstraction of the RBF classifier. As expected, the relational information of the RAF
abstraction makes it significantly more precise than interval abstraction, although in some cases intervals can
help in refining RAF analysis, and this justifies their combined use.
(a) (b)
Chart (c) shows how the provable robustness depends on the size of the training subset. We may observe
here that using more samples for training a SVM classifier tends to overfit the model, making it more sensitive
to perturbations, i.e. more vulnerable. Chart (d) shows what we call provable vulnerability of a classifier C: we
first consider all the samples (x, y) in the test set which are misclassified by C, i.e., C(x) = y′ 6= y holds,
then our robustness verifier is run on the perturbations P∞δ (x) of these samples for checking whether the region
P∞δ (x) can be proved to be consistently misclassified by C to y
′. Provable vulnerability is significantly lower
than provable robustness, meaning that when the classifier is wrong on an input vector, it is more likely to assign
different labels to similar inputs, rather than assigning the same (wrong) class.
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(c) (d)
Charts (e) and (f) show the average verification time per image, in milliseconds, with respect to the size
of the classifier, given by the number of support vectors, and compared for different abstractions. Let N and
n denote, resp., the number of support vectors and the size of input vectors. The interval-based abstract d-
polynomial classifier is in O(dN) time, while the RBF classifier is in O(N), because the interval multiplication
is constant-time. Hence, interval analysis is very fast, just a few milliseconds per image. On the other hand,
the RAF-based abstract d-polynomial and RBF classifiers are, resp., in O(dNn log n) and O(Nn log n), since
RAF multiplication is in O(n log n), so that RAF-based verification is slower although it never takes more than
0.5 seconds. Table (a) summarizes the precise percentages of provable robustness and average running times of
SAVer for the RBF classifier.
(e) (f)
(a)
P∞δ 0.001 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10
MNIST: Provable
100.00% 99.83% 99.57% 99.19% 97.27% 93.58% 82.21% 67.76% 48.02% 28.10% 16.38%robustness for RBF
Time per image (ms) 416.49 417.18 415.95 417.19 416.98 417.69 417.21 416.93 417.21 417.15 417.97
The same experiments have been replicated on the F-MNIST dataset, and the Charts (g) and (h) show a
comparison of the results between MNIST and F-MNIST. As expected, robustness is harder to prove (and
probably to achieve) on F-MNIST than on MNIST, while SAVer proved that F-MNIST is less vulnerable than
MNIST. Moreover, Table (b) shows the percentage of provable robustness for MNIST and F-MNIST for the
frame adversarial region defined in Section 5, for some widths of the frame. F-MNIST is significantly harder
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to prove robust under this attack than MNIST: this is due to the fact that the borders of MNIST images do
not contain as much information as their centers so that classifiers can tolerate some loss of information in the
border. By contrast, F-MNIST images often carry information on their borders, making them more vulnerable
to adversarial framing.
(g) (h)
(b)
P frmt
MNIST: Provable F-MNIST: Provable
Robustness Robustness
1 100.00% 49.56%
2 99.64% 4.71%
3 87.34% 0.00%
4 40.35% 0.00%
Finally, Table (c) compares SAVer with DeepPoly, a robustness verifier for feedforward neural networks
[32]. This comparison used the same test set of DeepPoly, consisting of the first 100 images of the MNIST test
set, and the same perturbations P∞δ . Among the benchmarks in [32, Section 6], we selected the FFNNSmall and
FFNNSigmoid deep neural networks, denoted, resp., by DeepPoly Small and Sigmoid. FFNNSmall has been
trained using a standard technique and achieved the best accuracies in [32], while FFNNSigmoid was trained
using PGD-based adversarial training, a technique explicitly developed to make a classifier more robust.
(c)
P∞δ
SAVer SAVer DeepPoly DeepPoly
poly9 RBF Sigmoid Small
0.005 100% 100% 100% 100%
0.010 98.9% 100% 98% 95%
0.015 98.9% 100% 97% 75%
0.020 97.8% 100% 95% 50%
0.025 97.8% 100% 92% 25%
0.030 96.7% 100% 80% 10%
It turns out that the percentages of robustness provable by SAVer are significantly higher than those provable
by DeepPoly (precise percentages are not provided in [32], we extrapolated them from the charts). In particular,
both 9-polynomial and RBF SVMs can be proved more robust that FFNNSigmoid networks, despite the fact
that these classifiers are defended by a specific adversarial training.
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7 Future Work
We believe that this work represents a first step in applying formal analysis and verification techniques to ma-
chine learning based on support vector machines. We envisage a number of challenging research topics as
subject for future work. Generating adversarial examples to machine learning methods is important for design-
ing more robust classifiers [12,41,45] and we think that the completeness of robustness verification of linear
binary classifiers (cf. Section 3) could be exploited for automatically detecting adversarial examples in linear
multiclass SVM classifiers. The main challenge here is to design more precise, ideally complete, techniques for
abstracting multi-classification based on binary classification. Adversarial SVM training is a further stimulating
research challenge. Mirman et al. [25] put forward an abstraction-based technique for adversarial training of
robust neural networks. We think that a similar approach could also work for SVMs, namely applying abstract
interpretation to SVM training models rather than to SVM classifiers.
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